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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“E.U. Scheme”) 
is the largest and most ambitious carbon dioxide emissions trading 
system in the world. However, Directive 2003/87/EC, which 
establishes the E.U. Scheme, gives the Member States of the 
European Union too much discretion to devise individual National 
Allocation Plans (“NAPs”). Germany’s NAP allows for the 
allocation of free emissions allowances. This methodology is 
inconsistent with the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This comment proposes two 
amendments to the Directive, namely the requirement of a minimum 
level of scarcity on the amount of emissions allowances in NAPs and 
the development of strict guidelines on the methods of distributions 
employed in those NAPs. These amendments would have key effects 
on subsequent phases of the E.U. Scheme. Specifically, they would 
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prevent Member States from bringing subsidy claims in the future 
and would ensure that the scheme operates at the most efficient and 
cost-effective level. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Climate change is the greatest environmental risk facing the 
world today.”1 The warmest year on record was 2005,2 and the top 
ten warmest years on record occurred in the past eleven years.3 The 
most active Atlantic hurricane season on record was in 2005, 
containing the most powerful hurricane ever recorded.4 Climate 
change, which occurs largely because of harmful greenhouse gas 
emissions,5 is causing these events and is not only dangerous, but is 
also extremely costly.6 Because climate change is such an immense 
threat, countries should control their emissions of carbon dioxide, the 
main greenhouse gas, otherwise, combating global warming will 
become even “more difficult and expensive.”7 
To combat climate change, many countries joined the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in 
1992.8 The UNFCC Parties then adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 
 
 1. DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, AN 
OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO THE E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: THE STEPS TO 
COMPLIANCE 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/eu/intro/euets-
guide.pdf [hereinafter OPERATOR’S GUIDE]. 
 2. See The Climate Group, Climate Change Facts, 
http://www.theclimategroup.org/index.php?pid=356 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) 
(displaying statistics collected over recent years that show the effects of the climate 
change and some of its disastrous consequences). 
 3. See id. (reporting that 1996 was the only year of the past eleven that was 
not one of the top ten warmest years on record). 
 4. See id. (showing that in addition to the deadly European heat wave of 2003 
and the disappearance of glaciers, climate change can cause other catastrophic 
effects such as hurricanes). 
 5. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 
9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, 168 [hereinafter 
UNFCCC] (defining greenhouse gases as “natural and anthropogenic” gases in the 
atmosphere that “absorb and re-emit infrared radiation”). 
 6. See id.; Steve Lohr, The Cost of an Overheated Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 2006, at C1 (predicting the high costs of carbon dioxide emissions on future 
generations in the form of low farm output in poor countries, and an increased 
number of refugees fleeing stronger hurricanes and coastal floods). 
 7. See id. (revealing that even the chief executive of a coal-burning utility 
advocates federally regulating carbon dioxide emissions by imposing costs on its 
emission). 
 8. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 165 (recognizing the threat 
of global climate change and setting general goals to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in order to stabilize the concentration of such gases in the earth’s 
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1997.9 The Kyoto Protocol shares the UNFCCC’s objectives, but 
strengthens them by adding legally binding targets of greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions.10 For example, the European Union must 
reduce emissions by eight percent.11 To meet this target, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
(“Council”) established the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (“E.U. Scheme”) pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC 
(“Directive”).12 
The purpose of emissions trading is to combat climate change by 
creating a market to provide efficient and practical solutions for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.13 Subsidies, however, defeat the 
objective of emissions trading by causing distortions in the market 
process.14 Subsidies decrease the efficiency with which an industry, 
 
atmosphere at a “level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”). 
 9. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 10. See id. art. 2–3, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 32–34, 43 (stressing that the 
ultimate objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
pursuit of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and listing the emissions 
standards for each country along with the rules for implementing those standards). 
 11. See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 43 (listing the specific emissions reduction 
targets for each Annex I country). 
 12. See Council Directive 2003/87, ¶ 5, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC) (announcing 
that the objective of the E.U. Scheme is to help the European Union fulfill its 
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol). 
 13. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, STATEMENT, 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME, 1, 3–4 
(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.umweltrat.de/english/eframe01.htm 
(explaining that the original purpose of emissions trading was to provide an 
economic incentive for countries and industries to operate in a more environment-
friendly way by making carbon dioxide pollution a “production factor” whose 
costs must be accounted for when forecasting production amounts); see also Susan 
J. Kurkowski, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union: Efficiency, 
Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 698, 704–05 (2006) (listing 
the five benefits that should result from emissions trading: (1) emissions reductions 
in a cost-effective manner; (2) higher compliance levels; (3) incentives for 
technological innovation; (4) reduced regulatory burdens; and (5) easier 
monitoring and enforcement); Lohr, supra note 6 (insisting that economic 
incentives are necessary for investment in cleanup and more fuel-efficient 
technological innovation). 
 14. See infra Part III.A.2 (concluding that, due to the E.U. Scheme granting its 
Member States discretion over their allocation of emissions allowances within their 
borders, Germany’s current system of allocation is a potential subsidy and serves 
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or an installation,15 allocates its resources, thereby violating the spirit 
of the Kyoto Protocol.16 
This comment acknowledges the potential benefits of the E.U. 
Scheme, but proposes an amendment to the Directive to prevent 
future subsidy claims the current setup could trigger. Part II briefly 
discusses the E.U. Scheme, National Allocation Plans (“NAPs”), and 
different methods of allocating emissions allowances. In addition, it 
discusses Germany’s NAP and the World Trade Organization’s 
(“WTO”) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(“SCM Agreement”).17 Part III analyzes the NAP of Germany and 
possible subsidy claims that could arise under the SCM Agreement. 
Part IV recommends that the Council modify the E.U. Scheme by 
imposing a uniform minimum level of scarcity and ensuring that the 
E.U. Member States18 use consistent methods of allocation. Part V 
concludes that although the E.U. Scheme is a good model for 
emissions trading in the international arena, it is imperfect, and thus 
the Council should amend it to avoid potential subsidy claims. 
 
 
to distort the emissions market); see also Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 704–05 
(listing one of the benefits of emissions trading as reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in a cost-effective manner). 
 15. For purposes of this comment “installation” is defined as under Council 
Directive 2003/87. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 3(e) (“[A] 
stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I are carried 
out and any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection 
with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on 
emissions and pollution.”). 
 16. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 770 (4th ed. 2002) 
(explaining that the key issue in identifying subsidies, or any government measure, 
is determining whether those measures are distorting or correcting the market 
process). 
 17. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex IA. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (defining “subsidy” for the 
purposes of the World Trade Organization); infra Part II B–C. 
 18. Throughout this comment, a “Member State” refers to a country that is a 
part of the European Union, while a “Member Country” refers to a country that is a 
part of the WTO. As it turns out, all Member States of the European Union are 
Member Countries of the WTO. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.19 It 
became legally binding when at least “55 Parties to the Convention 
[the UNFCCC], incorporating Parties included in Annex I which 
accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide 
emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I20 ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol.21 The Kyoto Protocol made the emissions reductions 
goals listed in Annex B22 binding on the countries that ratified it. 
Annex B assigns emissions allowances, or rights to emit gases,23 to 
the countries in order to promote the UNFCCC’s mission of 
 
 19. See Press Release, United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 
Kyoto Protocol to Enter into Force 16 February 2005 (Nov. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=412&Arti
cleID=4669&l=en (announcing that the Kyoto Protocol was entering into force and 
would become legally binding on its 128 Parties ninety days after the Russian 
Federation ratified it on November 18, 2004). 
 20. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, Annex I, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 189 (listing the 
developed or industrialized countries, such as Austria, Canada, Denmark, New 
Zealand, Turkey, and the United States, in Annex I of the UNFCCC). 
 21. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 24, 37 I.L.M. at 41 (explaining that 
the Kyoto Protocol was only to become binding on the ninetieth day after the two 
conditions were met and each party had deposited its instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval, or accession). 
 22. See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 43 (enumerating all of the developed 
countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC except for two, Belarus and Turkey, 
along with each country’s “quantified emission limitation or reduction 
commitment”); id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M at 33 (mandating that all Annex I countries 
not exceed their allowed amounts of greenhouse gas emissions, which are 
calculated according to their limitation and reduction commitments listed in Annex 
B). 
 23. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 3(a) (defining an 
allowance as “an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during 
a specified period”). But see Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the 
Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 150, 152–53 (2006) (pointing out that the 
definition of allowances in the United States Clean Air Act does not define 
emissions allowances as property rights, but instead characterizes them as 
transferable authorizations to emit gases. See generally Daveed Garenstein-Ross, 
An Analysis of the Rights-Based Justification for Federal Intervention in 
Environmental Regulation, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2003); 
Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 517 (2002); 
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and 
Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 105 (1999) 
(discussing the general concept of property rights relating to environmental 
regulation). 
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stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations24 in the atmosphere at a 
level that will prevent harmful interference with the climate system.25 
The Kyoto Protocol contains three mechanisms26 that Annex I 
countries can use to comply with the reduction requirements of 
Annex B.27 The first two mechanisms, the “joint implementation 
mechanism”28 and the “clean development mechanism,”29 involve 
 
 24. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, art. 1(5), 1771 U.N.T.S. at 168 (defining 
greenhouse gases); see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, Annex A, 37 I.L.M. at 
42 (listing the greenhouse gases included for emissions reductions purposes: 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and 
sulphur hexafluoride). 
 25. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, art. 2, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169 (elaborating that 
countries can achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC by stabilizing the 
level of greenhouse gas emissions within a period of time that is sufficient to 
“allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,” and to guarantee that 
resources for food production and economic development continue to thrive in a 
sustainable manner). 
 26. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 6, 12, 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 35, 38, 40 
(setting out the three different mechanisms: the joint implementation mechanism, 
clean development mechanism, and emissions trading). 
 27. See id. Annex A, B, 37 I.L.M. at 42, 43 (listing the numerical reduction 
requirements to which all Annex B countries must adhere and the sectors or source 
categories that are subject to emissions reductions: energy; industrial processes; 
solvent and other product use; agriculture; and waste). 
 28. See id. art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35 (discussing the joint implementation 
mechanism, which allows Annex I countries to transfer and acquire emissions 
reductions units, as long as they are the products of certain projects that aim 
specifically at reducing emissions, from other Annex I countries to meet their 
Annex B and Article 3 obligations under the Kyoto Protocol). The joint 
implementation mechanism projects are subject to certain conditions: (1) the 
countries involved must approve them; (2) the countries must ensure that the 
reduction of emissions are additional to any reduction that would otherwise occur; 
(3) the acquiring country must be in compliance with its obligations under Articles 
5 and 7 of the Kyoto Protocol; and (4) the countries must ensure that the 
“acquisition of emission reduction units” are in addition to domestic actions that 
they undertake to meet the commitments set forth in Article 3. Id. 
 29. See id. art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 38 (noting that the second mechanism, the clean 
development mechanism, encourages Annex I countries to assist countries not 
listed in Annex I—the developing countries—in achieving and contributing to 
sustainable development by funding projects in these countries). Participating 
Annex I countries can use the certified emissions reductions resulting from the 
projects to meet their own emissions reductions commitments. Clean development 
mechanism projects are subject to certain conditions: (1) the voluntary 
participation of the countries involved; (2) a showing of “real, measurable long-
term benefits” for the climate; and (3) the reductions must be additional to any 
reductions that would otherwise occur in the absence of a funded project. Id. 
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special projects that facilitate emissions reductions. The third 
mechanism permits Annex B countries to trade emissions allowances 
to fulfill their commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.30 
The Council established the Directive in order to create a system that 
would help Member States achieve their Annex B commitments31 
using the third mechanism—”emissions trading.”32 
A.  THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND 
NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union committed to an 
aggregate eight percent reduction33 of greenhouse gas emissions from 
1990 levels during the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, 2008 to 2012.34 The E.U. Scheme allows for the allocation 
and trade of greenhouse gas emissions allowances.35 It provides for 
 
 30. See id. art. 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 40 (mandating that, as with joint 
implementation and clean development mechanisms, countries make emissions 
trading supplemental to domestic actions that they undertake to meet their 
reductions commitments specified in Article 3). Countries may add emissions 
reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount of emissions allowances, which 
they acquire from another country using the clean development mechanism, to 
their assigned amounts. Alternatively, if a country transfers emissions reduction 
units to another country using the joint implementation or emissions trading 
mechanisms, it may subtract them from its assigned amounts. Id. art. 3(10)–(13), 
37 I.L.M. at 33. 
 31. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, ¶¶ 3–4 (defining the 
UNFCCC’s objective as the achievement of the stabilization of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases at the reduced levels that Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
assigned to the countries that ratified it). 
 32. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU and 
US Climate Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 465 
(2006) (explaining that the E.U. Scheme is supplemental to the national programs 
of Member States, as well as to their participation in the first two mechanisms in 
the Kyoto Protocol—the joint implementation mechanism and clean development 
mechanism projects). 
 33. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 43 (showing that 
the European Union, as a whole, committed to an aggregate eight percent 
reduction, individual countries of the European Union also have individual 
reduction commitments in Annex B). 
 34. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, ¶4. 
 35. See OPERATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 1, at 2–4 (highlighting how the 
“market-based” approach allows installations discretion to buy and sell allowances 
according to their needs but simultaneously ensures that installations do not exceed 
their allocated emissions). The E.U. Scheme is implemented by requiring Member 
States to make the Directive part of their national legislation. Id. at 4. 
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the flexibility, which the Kyoto Protocol envisioned,36 to buy 
additional allowances or sell surplus allowances.37 Pursuant to the 
Directive, Member States decide on the total quantity and allocation 
of allowances to each installation that the Directive covers.38 
The E.U. Scheme is one of the most significant policies that the 
European Union has enacted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
The E.U. Scheme covers specified installations, mostly in the energy 
production sector.39 They total to over 11,400 installations 
throughout the European Union, and are responsible for about half of 
all carbon dioxide emissions in the European Union.40 About 1,849 
of the installations are located in Germany,41 and these installations 
account for fifty-nine percent of the country’s carbon dioxide 
emissions.42 
Under the Directive, an allowance consists of the right to emit one 
ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent43 during a specific time 
period.44 Phase I, which runs from 2005 to 2007,45 is the “learning 
phase” of the E.U. Scheme,46 allowing Member States an opportunity 
 
 36. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 40 (noting that 
trading “shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article”). 
 37. OPERATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 38. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, arts. 9(1), 11(1)–(2) 
(referring Member States to Annex III of the Directive, which provides them with 
eleven general criteria to follow when they devise their individual NAPs). 
 39. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
7 (defining the energy production sector as one that emits over twenty megawatts 
of heat output). 
 40. See id.; Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 699–700 (elaborating on the 
unprecedented scope of the E.U. Scheme, which is not only the first multinational 
emissions trading scheme, but also the first large-scale carbon dioxide emissions 
trading system in the world). 
 41. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
7. 
 42. See id. (suggesting that Germany will allocate its carbon dioxide emissions 
free of charge until 2008, in line with the Directive’s mandate). 
 43. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 3(a). 
 44. See id. art. 3(a) (maintaining that the allowance is valid “only for the 
purposes of meeting the requirements of [the] Directive and shall be transferable in 
accordance with the provisions of [the] Directive”). 
 45. See id. art. 10 (noting that during the initial three-year period, Member 
States “shall allocate at least 95% of the allowances free of charge”). 
 46. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 706 (identifying the participating 
industries in the “learning phase” as “energy and major emitting industrials”). 
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to accustom themselves to trading before the first Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period.47 Phase II of the E.U. Scheme runs 
simultaneously with the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period, 
2008 to 2012.48 
The E.U. Scheme requires each Member State to develop a NAP 
that contains the total amount of emissions allowances that the 
Member State plans to allocate, as well as the ways in which it 
wishes to allocate them.49 The Directive also mandates that the 
Member States base their NAPs on “objective and transparent 
criteria,” and “take due account of comments from the public.”50 
Member States must then submit their NAPs to the Council for 
approval.51 The Council can reject a NAP within three months of its 
submission if the NAP does not conform to the specified 
guidelines.52 
Each NAP consists of a Macroplan and a Microplan.53 A 
Macroplan defines the total emissions budget for the Member State 
 
 47. See id.; see also Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of 
Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the European Union's CO2 Emissions 
Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 
913 (2005) (explaning that the four industries participating in Phase I of the E.U. 
Scheme include: iron and steel production and processing; minerals industries; 
electricity and refineries; and pulp and paper). 
 48. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10 (noting that during 
Phase II, “Member States shall allocate 90% of the allowances free of charge”); 
see also Carlarne, supra note 32, at 464 (explaining that Phase I includes only 
carbon dioxide emissions, but Phase II includes emissions of other greenhouse 
gases) 
 49. See id. art. 9 (providing guidelines that Member States should follow when 
they devise their NAPs for each period identified in Articles 11(1) and (2)). 
 50. See id. art. 9(3) (referring Member States to Annex III for further 
guidelines on developing their NAPs). 
 51. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
7 (explaining that NAPs must comply with a range of requirements that the 
Directive sets forth, and offering as an example the requirement that reduction 
targets take into account obligations under the Kyoto Protocol). 
 52. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 9(3) (mandating that the 
Commission provide the reasons for rejection to the Member State if its NAP is 
incompatible with the criteria listed under Article 10 and Annex III). 
 53. See, e.g., FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE 
CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 2005–2007, at 6 (2004) [hereinafter GERMAN 
NAP]. 
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and determines the total quantity of allowances that the government 
intends to distribute.54 A Microplan details how the government 
plans to distribute allowances to each of the participating 
installations.55 
B.  THE GERMAN NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN AND ITS STEEL 
INDUSTRY 
Germany based its emissions budget for its Macroplan on its target 
for the first reduction commitment of the Kyoto Protocol,56 as well as 
on the burden-sharing agreement within the European Union.57 
During Phase I, the E.U. Scheme confines emissions trading only to 
carbon dioxide.58 Germany distributed one-hundred percent of its 
emissions allowances free of charge during Phase I.59 During Phase 
 
 54. See id. at 6, 12 (explaining that Germany’s Macroplan directs the 
dispersion of the national emissions budget between various greenhouse gases, 
emissions trading segments, and to other sources consistent with its “national 
climate protection targets”). 
 55. See id. at 6, 7 (elaborating that the Microplan “defines the methods, rules, 
and criteria” for allocation decisions, as well as the quantity of emissions 
allowances that the Member State will grant to each of the individual installations). 
 56. See id. at 6 (stating that for the Phase II, Germany must reduce emissions 
by twenty-one percent compared to 1990 levels). The Macroplan supports the 
requirements of the E.U. reductions budget by breaking down the emissions 
allowances by type of greenhouse gas and sector. Id. 
 57. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 705–08 (describing how the burden-
sharing agreement distributes among Member States the eight percent required 
reduction from 1990 emissions levels in accordance with each country’s 
expectation for economic growth). For example, it requires Germany, a country of 
great relative wealth, to make a twenty-one percent reduction from 1990 levels, 
while allowing the less well-off Greece to actually increase its emissions twenty-
five percent above 1990 levels. Id. at 706. See also Paul Q. Watchman, 
Background to the EU ETS, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 191, 194 (J. 
William Futrelle et al. eds., 2006) (noting that all twenty-five Member States of the 
European Union have reduction commitments, however only the original fifteen 
have commitments under the burden-sharing agreement). All the new members 
must reduce their emissions by eight percent of 1990 levels, except for Hungry and 
Poland, which must reduce their emissions by six percent of 1990 levels. Id. 
 58. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 6, 13 (cautioning, however, that the 
Macroplan must provide for compensatory measures to combat unexpected 
changes in the emission of other gases that may occur in response to restrictions on 
CO2 emissions). 
 59. See id. at 4 (explaining that Article 10 of the Directive requires Member 
States to allocate at least ninety-five percent of emissions allowances free of 
charge during Phase 1). 
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II, Germany once again plans to distribute one-hundred percent of 
the allowances free of charge.60 It will only charge for the costs of 
issuing and distributing emissions certificates and for any costs that 
arise in connection with the maintenance of a registry of 
allowances.61 
During Phase I, the German NAP includes only certain industries 
and installations.62 The energy and industry sectors comprise most of 
the installations participating during Phase I.63 Moreover, the E.U. 
Scheme does not allow two sectors, transport and households, to 
participate in emissions trading.64 
The E.U. Scheme allows for many different methods of allocating 
allowances.65  The “grandfathering method” allows Member States to 
base allocation on historic emissions levels,66 so the amount of 
 
 60. See id. at 21. 
 61. See id. at 4 n.2. 
 62. See id. at 9, 11 (explaining that whether an installation is subject to 
emissions trading will depend on whether it falls within one of the categories in 
Germany’s “list of relevant installations,” including “energy generation and 
conversion,” “production and processing of ferrous metals,” “mineral industry,” 
and “other industrial activities”). 
 63. See id. at 19. 
 64. See id. at 20 (rationalizing that the German government has undertaken 
different measures and policies to reduce the amount of harmful greenhouse gas 
emissions in these sectors); see also Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 706–07 
(explaining that because the E.U. Scheme includes emissions from non-trading 
sectors in the aggregate reductions requirements, when devising NAPs and 
allocating emissions allowances, Member States will take any potential reductions 
from these non-trading sectors into account). 
 65. See Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating the 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Marketplace, 10 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 206–08 (2000) (contending that every country 
may select the way in which it allocates the burden of emissions limits, “regardless 
of the form of environmental regulation,” and despite the fact that certain methods 
may “favor some groups over others”); see also European Comm’n, Working 3 
Monitoring Mechanism Comm., Non-Paper, The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: 
How to Develop a National Allocation Plan, 5, Apr. 1, 2003 [hereinafter How to 
Develop a NAP]. 
 66. See Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (explaining that under the 
grandfathering approach countries may subdivide their emissions allocations into 
either “upstream” or “downstream” allocations); see also How to Develop a NAP, 
supra note 65, at 4 (emphasizing that under such an approach, a Member State will 
distribute some or all of its emissions allowances among the participating 
industries and installations according to the shares of their historic emissions levels 
during a particular year, and then it will multiply that number by the total amount 
SHAH.DOC 3/31/2007  12:49:03 PM 
2007] THE ALLOCATION OF FREE EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES 457 
emissions that the installations emitted during a specific period 
determines allocation.67 Under the “auction method” of allocation, a 
Member State auctions its allowances for the commitment period to 
the highest bidders.68 The “benchmarking method” allows Member 
States to base individual allocations of allowances on “the average 
specific emissions of a product category.”69 
Different rules and procedures, such as banking,70 govern the 
allocation of emissions allowances under different circumstances.71 
 
of emissions available). 
 67. See CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK EUROPE, NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS 
2005–7: DO THEY DELIVER? 24 (2006), available at www.climnet.org [hereinafter 
CAN EUROPE] (pointing out that the E.U. Scheme does not define specific base 
years for Member States to use for allocations). This is problematic because 
Member States tend to choose a calculation of base years that ensures above 
average base levels of emissions, resulting in a greater allocation of emissions 
allowances and leading to “additional distortions and complaints about fairness 
within countries and across borders.” Id. at 24–25. 
 68. See id. at 27 (recommending that Member States distribute emissions 
allowances using the auction method, so the “‘polluter pays principle’ can be fully 
implemented” in the E.U. Scheme). In addition, the auction method has major 
advantages over the grandfathering and benchmark methods because it generates 
revenue for the government and provides the biggest incentive for installations to 
reduce emissions so they do not have to pay for more emissions allowances. Id. 
See also Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (elaborating that governments can hold 
auctions more than once, and even during the commitment period). 
 69. GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 7; see CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 25 
(clarifying that the Benchmarking Method is “inherently sector or even sub-sector 
specific,” and emphasizing that Member States should not make benchmarks fuel-
specific, but should make them product-specific); see also GERMAN ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 10 (criticizing the fuel-specific 
method because when benchmarks focus on the best-available technology at a 
particular installation, this results in differing allocations for fuel, such as coal and 
gas). This fuel-specific method reduces the incentive for installations to switch 
from coal and gas to fuels that are more efficient. Id. 
 70. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 43 (explaining that the Directive 
permits Member States to transfer, or “bank,” unused allowances at the end of a 
trading period on to the next period). The German NAP does not permit 
installations to bank the unused allowances from Phase I and use them in Phase II 
because the banking of allowances would increase the total allowances distributed 
during the Kyoto Protocol commitment period 2008 to 2012. Id. at 43–44. 
Furthermore, the lack of harmonization of banking arrangements throughout the 
European Union would make it harder for a Member State to achieve its Kyoto 
Protocol target. Id. at 43. 
 71. See id. at 21 (explaining that the transfer rule and the new entrant rule 
govern the allocation of emissions allowances to certain existing and new 
installations, and the closure rule allows for the modification of the allowances that 
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Special rules may apply “for installations that achieved early 
emissions reductions (early actions), for process-related emissions, 
for installations using combined heat and power, and for closure of 
nuclear power plants.”72 These special rules cause regulatory 
uncertainty because they result in allocations that exceed the 
forecasted budget.73 
Germany allocated allowances using the grandfathering method 
and the benchmarking method.74 In addition, it applied special rules 
to its steel industry, regulating it under “process-related emissions” 
because the release of carbon dioxide results from “a chemical 
reaction other than combustion.”75 Therefore, Germany granted these 
types of processes special treatment76 when it assigned and allocated 
emissions allowances.77 
 
Member States issued to decommissioned installations, whose allowances are not 
transferable to new installations). The transfer rule allows for the transfer of 
emissions from installations that Member States decommissioned to installations 
commissioned starting January 1, 2005, and the new entrant rule allows for the 
allocation of free allowances to installations that are not eligible to receive 
allowances through the transfer rule. Id. In addition, Member States modify the 
issuance of allowances in conjunction with certain “capacity utilisation adjustment 
rules.” Id. 
 72. GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 11 
(internal cross-references omitted). 
 73. See id. at 11–12 (suggesting that the special allocation rules also result in 
installations postponing investment into more energy-efficient equipment and 
activities). This results in higher future allocations of emissions allowances and 
lower liquidity in current emissions trading. Id. 
 74. See id. (explaining that the German government will use emissions data 
from the 2000 to 2002 reference period when it calculates the allocation of 
allowances under the grandfathering and the benchmarking methods). 
 75. Id. at 39 (manufacture of oxygen steel and pig iron production). 
 76. See id. (distinguishing process-related emissions from energy-related 
emissions, which the government calculates on the basis of the rules in Section C.6 
of the German NAP and which uses the generally applicable compliance factor). 
 77. See id. at 39–40 (elaborating that Annex III of the Directive gives Member 
States the basis on which to grant special treatment, and it instructs that 
governments take into account the “technological potential for reductions”). 
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C.  SUBSIDY CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON 
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
In international trade, two categories of subsidies exist: domestic 
and export.78 A domestic subsidy arises when the government grants 
a financial contribution to an industry, regardless of whether the 
industry exports its products.79 An export subsidy occurs when the 
government pays an industry only for the products it actually 
exports.80 The main issue regarding subsidies is not whether the 
governmental measures cause distortions, but whether the measures 
positively or negatively effect the efficiency with which an industry 
allocates resources.81 
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which is a WTO82 trade 
agreement, details that a subsidy exists when a government makes a 
“financial contribution” to an industry within its territory.83 A 
subsidy can occur if the practice in question involves a “direct 
transfer of funds,” such as “grants, loans, and equity infusion,” or a 
“potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities.”84 It can also occur if 
the government provides “any form of income or price support.”85 
But, most importantly, the financial contribution must result in a 
“benefit... conferred” to the subsidizing Member Country’s 
 
 78. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 767. 
 79. See id. at 767–68 (defining a domestic subsidy and explaining that a 
subsidy is a protectionist measure because it lowers prices on domestic products 
below prices of competing foreign products). 
 80. See id. at 768 (asserting that in the case of export subsidies, exporters can 
sell goods in other countries at a price below the domestic price for the same 
goods, resulting in an uneconomic allocation of resources). 
 81. Id. at 770. 
 82. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
Pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 (reaffirming the WTO’s commitments to 
“develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system,” while 
“allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment”). See generally JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 208–09 
(discussing the evolution of the WTO from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade of 1947 (“GATT”), a provisional international trade treaty). 
 83. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (defining 
“subsidy” for the purposes of the World Trade Organization). 
 84. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(i), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14. 
 85. Id. art. 1.1(a)(2), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (referring to the definition of income 
or price support in Article XVI of GATT 1994). 
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industry.86 The WTO Appellate Body analyzed this provision in 
Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, and 
interpreted “benefit” as an advantage to the recipient in the market.87 
The SCM Agreement defines three categories of subsidies in 
Articles 3, 5, and 8.88 The first category consists of prohibited 
subsidies, which are export subsidies.89 The second consists of 
actionable subsidies, which cause “adverse effects” to the interests of 
another Member Country.90 Finally, the third category consists of 
non-actionable subsidies,91 which are a limited category of subsidies 
 
 86. Id. art. 1.1(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14. 
 87. See Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 149–61, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter 
Canada—Civilian Aircraft] (upholding the Panel’s interpretation of a benefit, and 
stressing that the benefit does not have to be conferred to the granting authority or 
government). 
 88. SCM Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 3, 5, 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16, 18, 22–
24; see also id. arts. 4, 7, 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16–17, 20–22, 25 (assigning differing 
remedies to violations of each of the specific types of subsidies because of 
differing degrees of harm to the complaining Member Country, or degrees of 
benefits conferred to the subsidizing Member Country). 
 89. See id. art. 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16 (providing that this type of subsidy must 
be contingent on export performance, or on the use of domestic over imported 
products); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES (1994) [hereinafter USTR STATEMENT] (pointing out 
that to challenge this type of subsidy, a Member Country must only prove the 
existence of the subsidy, but does not have to demonstrate that the subsidy has any 
adverse trade effects); Petsonk, supra note 65, at 205 (explaining that the WTO 
subjects prohibited subsidies to an “expedited timetable for action by the Dispute 
Settlement body,” so if it finds a prohibited subsidy, the subsidizing Member 
Country must immediately withdraw it or the complaining Member Country can 
take appropriate countermeasures). 
 90. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (stressing 
that no Member Country can act in a way that will cause adverse effects to the 
interests of others by: injuring the domestic industry of another Member Country; 
“nullifying or impairing” the benefits accruing, either directly or indirectly, to 
another Member Country; or by seriously prejudicing the interests of another 
Member Country). 
 91. See id. art. 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 23–24 (describing in detail the different 
situations under which a panel may characterize subsidies as non-actionable 
subsidies); see also Petsonk, supra note 65, at 205–06 (elaborating on the types of 
possible specific subsidies that involve assistance, such as: support for industrial 
research; development activities in disadvantaged regions; or assistance for 
adapting existing facilities to meet environmental requirements that new 
SHAH.DOC 3/31/2007  12:49:03 PM 
2007] THE ALLOCATION OF FREE EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES 461 
that are not actionable if they meet the strict criteria enumerated in 
the SCM Agreement,92 particularly in Article 8.2(c).93 
If a Member Country believes that another Member Country’s 
measure is a subsidy, it must first conduct consultations with the 
suspected Member Country.94 If consultations are not successful, the 
complaining Member Country can request that a panel hear its 
claim.95 The panel will make a decision and order a remedy if 
appropriate.96 Both Member Countries will have the opportunity to 
appeal the panel decision to the Appellate Body.97 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Germany’s allocation of free emissions allowances is a subsidy 
because it constitutes a financial contribution by the government and 
a benefit is conferred to the installations that receive the financial 
contribution, which is the allocation of free emissions allowances.98 
Once a panel concludes that a particular measure is a subsidy, it must 
determine what type of subsidy the measure constitutes.99 In this 
 
regulations impose). 
 92. See USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 (listing and analyzing the criteria for 
the three types of non-actionable subsidies: research subsidies; subsidies to 
disadvantaged regions; and subsidies for environmental adaptation). 
 93. SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.2(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 24. 
 94. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 259 (hypothesizing that 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding requires consultations to allow 
Member Countries to resolve disputes without resorting to formal dispute 
settlement procedures). 
 95. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, art. 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1229 (1994) 
[hereinafter Understanding on Rules and Procedures] (providing a sixty day 
timeframe for countries to settle a dispute with consultations). 
 96. See id. art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 1233 (requiring panels to make an “objective 
assessment” of the issues in regard to the facts of the particular cases and relevant 
provisions in dispute). In addition, panels should submit final reports within six 
months, or in emergencies, within three months. Id. art. 12.8., 33 I.L.M. at 1234. 
 97. See id. art. 17.1, 33 I.L.M. at 1236 
 98. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 
(providing that a subsidy could exist if not just the government, but “any public 
body within the territory of a Member,” makes a financial contribution and a 
benefit is conferred). 
 99. See id. arts. 4, 7, 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16–17, 20–22, 25 (providing a 
SHAH.DOC 3/31/2007  12:49:03 PM 
462 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [22:445 
case, a panel could find that the allocation of free emissions 
allowances is either an actionable subsidy100 or a non-actionable 
subsidy. 101 
A.  GERMANY’S ALLOCATION OF FREE EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES 
COULD CONSTITUTE A SUBSIDY AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE 1.1 OF 
THE SCM AGREEMENT 
Germany’s allocation of free emissions allowances pursuant to its 
NAP could constitute a subsidy. Under the SCM Agreement, a 
subsidy results when a government makes a “financial contribution” 
to an industry within its territory and a “benefit is... conferred” to the 
subsidized industry.102 A WTO panel must ultimately assess whether 
a governmental measure meets these two conditions.103 
1.  The Allocation of Free Allowances Constitutes a Distribution of a 
“Financial Contribution” 
The first and most important question regarding the allocations of 
free allowances is whether a WTO panel would hold that these 
allowances are financial contributions.104 When Germany allocates 
 
consultation process for dispute resolution and remedies due once the Members 
determine the type of subsidy that a measure constitutes). 
 100. See id. art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (defining an actionable subsidy as one 
that is “specific” and causes “adverse effects to the interests” of other Member 
Countries). 
 101. See id. art. 8.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 22 (identifying non-actionable subsidies 
as those that are not “specific,” according to Article 2, or those that are “specific” 
but fall within one of the three categories and meet the conditions that Article 8.2 
outlines). 
 102. Id. art. 1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14; see JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 
16, at 780 (clarifying that WTO law generally characterizes subsidies as the benefit 
to the recipient, rather than the cost to the subsidizing government, because a “cost 
to the government” interpretation would exclude situations where a private body 
under the government’s direction confers a “benefit”). 
 103. See JACKSON DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 260 (discussing the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and indicating that a panel is composed of three 
individuals who serve not as representatives of their countries, but in their 
individual capacities, and many of whom are government officials, former 
Secretariat officials, trade academics, or trade lawyers). The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding dictates that the panel examines the matter at issue “in 
light of the relevant provisions” at dispute, makes appropriate findings and 
recommendations, or gives rulings. Id. at 261. 
 104. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 
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free emissions allowances to industries, specifically the steel industry 
and its participating installations, the installations receive windfall 
benefits.105 Essentially, Germany is allocating significant assets to the 
installations.106 As a result, Germany is granting financial 
contributions to the steel industry.107 
When a country allocates emissions allowances, it alters the asset 
base of an installation.108 In an efficient emissions trading system, 
installations have incentives to take measures to reduce emissions, 
such as investing in more efficient and less carbon intensive 
technology to become more competitive.109 However, when Germany 
grants free emissions allowances, installations receive windfall 
profits, regardless of any improved competitive position or 
profitability.110 
The German steel installations will automatically have an 
advantage over steel installations in other Member States, whose 
 
(elaborating on various circumstances under which a government can make a 
financial contribution). But see Petsonk, supra note 65, at 208 (theorizing that a 
WTO panel would probably answer this initial question in the negative). 
 105. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
2. 
 106. See id. (analogizing the allocation of free emissions allowances with the 
allocation of assets to the businesses and installations that receive them). 
 107. See id. at 16 (characterizing the allocation of free allowances as an “across-
the-board subsidy” because the emissions allowances are not linked to the 
business’s output and so changes its asset values). But see Petsonk, supra note 65, 
at 208–09 (arguing that characterizing allocations as subsidies would be the same 
as saying that “any allocation of any type of responsibility for regulation,” either 
domestic or international, would also constitute a subsidy). 
 108. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
2 (arguing that a government will alter the asset base of an installation if it 
distributes emissions allowances free of charge, and this alteration will be 
independent of the installation’s new level of profitability, therefore, having 
nothing to do with an increased ability to make profits). 
 109. See CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 27 (indicating that installations reduce 
emissions by lowering their consumption of and demand for energy).  Although 
requiring installations to pay for emissions is costly in the short run, the “polluter 
pays principle” provides the biggest incentive for installations to reduce emissions, 
and therefore results in the most effective emissions trading system in the long-run. 
Id. 
 110. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
2 (explaining the dangers, or “allocation battles,” of allocating emissions 
allowances to installations and industries free of charge). 
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governments do not allocate emissions allowances free of charge.111 
Germany limits the regulatory burdens of the installations when it 
provides them with free emissions allowances.112 These installations, 
in turn, can sell to installations in other Member States that have 
higher regulatory burdens to meet.113 
The installations in other Member States will have to pay German 
steel installations a monetary value for the emissions allowances that 
they buy.114 Therefore, because German steel installations can sell 
emissions allowances on the market to competing installations in 
other Member States,115 their emissions allowances represent a 
monetary value. Thus, Germany’s practice of allocating emissions 
allowances free of charge constitutes a financial contribution because 
it involves “a direct transfer of funds.”116 
 
 
 111. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10 (mandating that 
during Phase I, governments must allocate at least ninety-five percent of emissions 
allowances free of charge, and during Phase II, decreasing the number to at least 
ninety percent of emissions allowances that governments must allocate free of 
charge). 
 112. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702 (describing the competitive 
advantage of installations that receive emissions allowances free of charge). But 
see GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 16 
(construing competitiveness as the “ability to make a profit from business 
activities,” and reasoning that free allowances do not impact competitiveness 
because they alter the “price for all installations equally”). 
 113. Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702. 
 114. See id. at 717 (explaining that capital flows from the installation that has to 
buy allowances from an installation in another Member State—the importer of 
allowances—to the German installation selling the allowances—the exporter of 
allowances); see also GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra 
note 13, at 3 (analogizing that the legislature has, in effect, made carbon dioxide 
emissions allowances “a tradable good”). 
 115. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 704 (introducing emissions trading as a 
“cap-and-trade” scheme where firms have the choice of keeping emissions at or 
below a certain cap by investing in better technology, or buying emissions 
allowances on the market to remain below the cap; thus a marketplace develops for 
these purchases). 
 116. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(i), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14. 
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2.  Because the Emissions Allowances Do Not Reflect Market Value 
and Thus, Distort the Free Market System, a  “Benefit is... 
Conferred” to the German Steel Industry 
Germany’s financial contribution, resulting from its allocation of 
free emissions allowances, results in a benefit conferred to its steel 
industry.117 In Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s interpretation of 
“benefit” as an advantage to the recipient in the market, and stated 
that “the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison 
in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred.’”118 Financial 
contributions distort trade, and a panel can identify this distortion by 
determining whether the industry received the financial contribution 
on “terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the 
market.”119 
In an efficient emissions trading market, installations have the 
incentive to invest in low carbon technology to avoid buying 
emissions allowances in the market.120 However, when Germany 
allocates free emissions allowances, these incentives disappear 
because installations will not have to pay for allowances.121  
 
 117. See id. art. 1.1(a), (b), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (mandating that a subsidy exists 
when a governmental measure involves a financial contribution and a “benefit is 
thereby conferred”). 
 118. Canada-Civilian Aircraft, supra note 87 ¶¶ 149–61 (emphasizing that the 
structure of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement is concerned with the benefit to the 
recipient and does not concern the cost to the government). The Appellate Body 
also contends that the marketplace provides an “appropriate basis” for calculating 
whether the measure made the recipient better off). Id. 
 119. Id. ¶ 157. 
 120. See OPERATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3 (instructing that emissions 
trading schemes use a “market-based mechanism to incentivise” installations to 
reduce emissions in a “cost-effective and economically-efficient manner”). In 
addition, installations can buy allowances on the market, or they can sell any extra 
allowances they generated from reducing their emissions. Id. CAN EUROPE, supra 
note 67, at 27 (advancing the proposition that when governments require 
installations to pay for their emissions allowances, they provide the installations 
with the incentive to switch fuels, lower consumption, invest in better technology, 
and reduce energy demand); GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 13, at 9 (showing that the “possibility of selling unused allowances” 
provides installations with an incentive to invest in low carbon technology). 
 121. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
16 (emphasizing that the purpose of emissions trading is to place a “greater 
burden” on those installations with high carbon technology, and the “intended 
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Therefore, under Germany’s NAP, installations receive allowances 
on terms more favorable than the terms they would otherwise receive 
in the market.122 
By allocating free emissions allowances, Germany also distorts the 
emissions market in such a way that allowances no longer reflect 
market value.123 When emissions allowances no longer reflect market 
value, the German steel industry has an advantage over steel 
industries in other Member States.124 The distribution methods that 
Germany used in its NAP are the main reasons that the emissions 
allowances do not reflect market value.125 
Under the grandfathering method of distribution, Germany based 
the allocation of allowances on the amount of greenhouse gases 
installations emitted in the past during a particular “base” period.126 
However, the E.U. Scheme leaves the crucial choice of assigning a 
base period to the Member States, which results in high gaming 
incentives and rent seeking by those that it affects.127 Under the 
benchmarking method of distribution, Germany based the allocation 
of emissions allowances on the expected or potential output 
 
outcome of [the] regulation” is to provide incentives to these installations to invest 
in low carbon technologies). 
 122. See id. at 3 (explaining that Member States should introduce emissions 
allowances as a new scarce resource, and this scarcity factor will drive the ultimate 
cost of emissions allowances in the market). 
 123. See id. (providing that an ideal emissions trading system allows market 
mechanisms to control the prices of the individual units, and all the government 
needs to do is create the proper conditions to allow trading to occur); see also 
Lohr, supra note 6 (suggesting that the most important step in combating climate 
change is setting a “real price on carbon emissions,” which allows for greater 
efficiency in the short-run, and more investment in better technology and research 
in the long-run). 
 124. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 709 (predicting that inconsistent 
allocation methods may provide industries in one Member State with an advantage 
over industries in another Member State). 
 125. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 21 (explaining that the German 
government used historical emissions data and announced emissions to allocate its 
emissions allowances during Phase I of the E.U. Scheme, and it also applied 
“Special Rules” under certain circumstances). 
 126. See CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 24–25 (elaborating that Member States 
use this as their primary method of allocation, but because base years and the 
methods of calculation for emissions differ between the Member States, this 
method is problematic). 
 127. See id. at 25 (concluding that the grandfathering method of allocation has 
led to complaints about fairness between Member States). 
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quantities of a product.128 However, calculating these amounts is 
extremely difficult and “fraught... with imperfections and potentially 
significant deviations from reality.”129 
Under both of the methods that Germany used, perpetuating the 
status quo by granting more allowances to installations that emitted a 
greater amount of emissions in the past was inevitable.130 This results 
because when governments distribute emissions allowances free of 
charge, they base distribution on many factors that are not 
necessarily representative of market value.131 These factors include 
different types of pressures from interest groups or powerful 
industries with various political, social, or financial agendas.132 
In addition, Germany applies special rules, which are more lenient, 
to its steel industry.133 Therefore, the steel installations have lower 
reduction obligations to meet in comparison to other industries.134 
Moreover, special rules cause installations to postpone investment in 
more energy-efficient technology.135 These special rules result in the 
 
 128. See id. (noting that this method of allocation is favorable to the 
grandfathering method, especially for new entrants, because it does not require 
past emissions data to determine the allocation amount of emissions allowances). 
But see GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 4 
(insisting that three conditions—preclusion of production distortions by 
installations for the purpose of maximizing allocations, security of long-term rights 
of use, and unrestricted tradability of allowances— must exist in order for the 
allocation process to be “effective and efficient” and to “give rise to the logical 
necessity for the allocation of allowances not to be linked to future output”). 
 129. CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 26. 
 130. See id. at 25 (warning that the benchmarking method of distribution can 
exaggerate the situation very easily in terms of carbon dioxide emissions when the 
government uses it improperly). 
 131. See Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (addressing the possibility that a 
government might allocate emissions allowances to further particular policies that 
it considers important). 
 132. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 711 (conceding that the discretion that 
Member States have in allocating emissions allowances results in huge incentives 
for different interest groups to invest in lobbying efforts to try to influence the 
allocation decisions where “billions of euros” are often at stake). 
 133. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 39 (enumerating the compliance 
factor for process-related emissions as one example). 
 134. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
12 (finding that the German government applied special rules to almost half of the 
emissions allowances that it allocated during Phase I of the E.U. Scheme). 
 135. See id. (theorizing that installations postpone investments to keep their 
options open and maximize their future allocations of emissions allowances). 
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grant of a greater number of allowances to inefficient installations, as 
opposed to those installations that adopt efficient technological 
measures to protect the environment.136 
The E.U. Scheme allows Member States to have discretion over 
how to allocate their emissions allowances between the industries 
and installations within their countries.137 Germany uses this 
discretion to employ distribution methods and apply rules that result 
in allocations that distort the market system, benefiting its domestic 
steel industry.138 Because Germany makes a financial contribution to 
the steel industry when it freely allocates emissions allowances, 
conferring a benefit to the steel industry, Germany’s method of 
distribution could constitute a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.139 
B.  GERMANY’S ALLOCATION OF FREE EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES 
COULD BE EITHER AN ACTIONABLE SUBSIDY OR A NON-
ACTIONABLE SUBSIDY UNDER THE SCM AGREEMENT 
The governmental measure at issue here is Germany’s allocation 
of free emissions allowances (particularly to its steel industry) that 
Germany instituted pursuant to its NAP, which it enacted under the 
Directive.140 A subsidy exists because the governmental measure at 
 
 136. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 29 (noting that the grandfathering 
process provides more favorable allowances to inefficient installations rather than 
to efficient ones, and highlighting the Council’s efforts to counter this problem by 
permitting governments to credit early action measures by installations in the form 
of special allowances). 
 137. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 9 (providing guidelines, 
rather than requirements, that Member States should follow when they devise their 
NAPs for each period to which Article 11(1) and (2) refers); see also Kurkowski, 
supra note 13, at 702, 708–09 (critiquing discretionary emissions allowance 
allocation on the grounds that equity concerns result if Member States are 
susceptible to the narrow interests of powerful industries, and that preferential 
treatment to favored industries burdens other industries, the taxpayers, and the 
non-trading sectors). 
 138. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
16 (concluding that the allocation of free emissions allowances has the effect of an 
“across-the-board subsidy not linked to output” and therefore results in windfall 
profits to the participating installations). 
 139. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14. 
 140. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 39 (providing that process-related 
carbon-dioxide emissions will apply to the manufacture of oxygen and steel and in 
pig iron production therefore qualifying them for special rules allowances). 
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issue is a financial contribution that confers a benefit to the German 
steel industry. The SCM Agreement distinguishes between three 
types of subsidies.141 The allocation of free allowances is clearly not 
a prohibited subsidy because the practice is not contingent on “export 
performance,” nor is it contingent on “the use of domestic over 
imported goods.”142 However, a panel could find that the measure is 
either an actionable subsidy143 or a non-actionable subsidy.144 
1.  Germany’s Allocation of Free Emissions Allowances Could Be an 
Actionable Subsidy 
A panel could find that the allocation of free emissions allowances 
by Germany is an actionable subsidy. Under the SCM Agreement, an 
actionable subsidy exists when a governmental measure is specific145 
and causes “adverse effects to the interests”146 of other Member 
Countries. These effects include: “an injury to the domestic industry 
of another Member; nullification or impairment of benefits...;147 or 
serious prejudice148 to the interests of another Member.”149 
 
 141. See SCM Agreement, supra note 83, arts. 3, 5, 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16, 18, 
23–25. 
 142. See id. art. 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16. 
 143. See id. art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (defining an actionable subsidy as a 
measure that causes “adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a) 
injury to the domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment 
of benefits accruing directly or indirectly. . .; (c) serious prejudice to the interests 
of another Member”). 
 144. See id. art. 8.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 22 (defining non-actionable subsidies as 
those that fail the specificity test of Article 2, or satisfy one of its exceptions); id. 
art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25 (limiting the scope of non-actionable subsidies to 
situations in which the subsidies cause “serious adverse effects” to the domestic 
industry of another Member Country). 
 145. See id. art. 1.2, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (subjecting a subsidy to the provision 
of Part III, which elaborates on actionable subsidies, only if the subsidy meets the 
specificity requirements articulated in Article 2). 
 146. Id. art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18. 
 147. See id. art. 5(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (elaborating that the nullification or 
impairment of benefits accruing could be either direct or indirect, and referring in 
particular the benefits of GATT 1994 Article II concessions); see, e.g., USTR 
STATEMENT, supra note 89 (stating that an instance of nullification or impairment 
occurs when a subsidy negates the value of a tariff cut). 
 148. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18–20 
(defining a serious prejudice to exist when: the “total ad valorem subsidization of a 
product” exceeds five percent; the subsidies cover operating losses that an industry 
has to endure; the subsidies cover operating losses other than “one-time measures” 
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In order for a panel to hold that a governmental measure is an 
actionable subsidy, the measure must meet the specificity 
requirement set forth in Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.150 The 
allocation of free allowances meets this specificity requirement 
because Germany “explicitly limits access” of the emissions 
allowances to the industries that the Directive includes in the E.U. 
Scheme.151 The NAP explains that other measures and policies 
govern those industries that the Directive does not include in the 
E.U. Scheme, such as the transport and household sectors.152 
Therefore, since the Directive explicitly limits the NAP to certain 
industries,153 it meets the specificity requirement. 
When Germany allocates all of its emissions allowances free of 
charge to its steel industry, it could cause adverse effects to the steel 
industry of another Member State. Germany’s measure could 
potentially injure the steel industry of another Member State that 
does not receive its emissions allowances free of charge, but through 
another method of allocation, such as the auction method.154 The 
 
that are “given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions” 
and to avoid short-term social problems; or “the direct forgiveness of debt” that an 
installation owes to the government); see also USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 
(explaining that a panel will base the determination of serious prejudice on 
measurable and verifiable data). 
 149. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 
(prohibiting Members from enacting a subsidy, as defined in Article 1, that causes 
adverse effects to the interests of other Members). 
 150. Id. art. 1.2, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14. 
 151. Id. art. 2.1(a), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 15. 
 152. See id. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 20 (listing some of the most 
successful measures and policies for climate protection in the transport sector as 
“ecological tax reform,” “promotion of renewable energy sources for fuels,” and a 
“campaign to encourage a climate-conscious attitude in transport”). Some of the 
most successful measures in the household sector include a carbon dioxide 
reduction program, a carbon dioxide building redevelopment program, and a 
housing modernization program. Id. 
 153. See id. at 7 (pointing out that the installations that the NAP covers for 
emissions trading, for the most part, comprise the energy and industrial sectors). 
 154. See Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (characterizing the auction method as 
one in which a country sells either a portion or all of its emissions allowances to 
the installations that can afford to bid the highest for them); see also CAN EUROPE, 
supra note 67, at 28 (explaining that only four Member States have used the 
auction method, but none of them have used it extensively). 
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foreign steel industry would have a higher regulatory burden to meet 
because it would have to pay for its emissions allowances.155 
Germany could also seriously prejudice the interests of another 
Member State by covering the operating losses its own steel industry 
would have to endure,156 while other Member States might not grant 
their industries the same luxury. The subsidy could have the effect of 
a significant undercutting of the price of steel in Germany as 
opposed to the other Member States.157 Germany would have the 
burden of demonstrating that serious prejudice to the interests of 
other Member States does not result from its method of allocation.158 
2.  Germany’s Allocation of Free Emissions Allowances Could Be a 
Non-Actionable Subsidy 
A panel could find that the allocation of emissions allowances free 
of charge by Germany is a non-actionable subsidy if the measure 
meets the criteria laid out in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement.159 A 
subsidy that meets the non-actionable criteria does not invoke 
consultations and remedies unless the “Member has reason to believe 
that [the action] has resulted in serious adverse effects to the 
domestic industry of that Member.”160 However, Member States may 
 
 155. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702, 709 (hypothesizing that differing 
allocation methods between Member States could give an industry in one Member 
State a competitive advantage over an industry in another Member State). 
 156. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6.1(b), 6.1(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 
(identifying measures that the government enacts to cover operating losses as an 
act seriously prejudicial to the interests of another Member State). 
 157. See generally id. art. 6.3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 19 (giving various instances in 
which serious prejudice may arise including instances where the subsidy 
significantly undercuts the price of the subsidized product). 
 158. See USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 (explaining that if a subsidy falls 
within any of the four categories listed in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement, a 
WTO panel will presume serious prejudice, and will place the burden on the 
subsidizing government to prove that serious prejudice did not result from its 
actions). 
 159. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 22–25 
(elaborating that subsidies are non-actionable if they are not specific, or if they are 
specific and fall into one of the three categories set forth in Article 8.2: 
government assistance for certain research activities; assistance to disadvantaged 
regions for development; or assistance to promote adaptation of facilities to new 
environmental requirements). 
 160. See id. art. 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25 (providing circumstances under which 
Member Countries can invoke consultations and remedies for non-actionable 
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request consultations and authorized remedies for these types of 
subsidies if they cause “serious adverse effects” to their domestic 
industry and the damage that the subsidies cause is “difficult to 
repair.”161 
The German government likely would argue that although the 
allocation of free allowances is not a subsidy, if a panel did find that 
the measure was a subsidy, it would be non-actionable because it 
meets the criteria laid out in Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement 
regarding assistance for environmental regulations.162 The 
government would argue that the measure constitutes government 
“assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities” to “new 
environmental requirements.”163 The German government would 
then argue that the Directive laid out new requirements that 
installations had to meet,164 and by freely allocating allowances, 
Germany simply was aiding installations as it adjusted to the new 
requirements. 
While the German NAP allowed for the allocation of free 
emissions allowances in Phase I of E.U. Scheme,165 it also allows for 
the allocation of free allowances in Phase II.166 The measure at issue, 
therefore, does not meet the first condition: that the assistance must 
be a “one-time non-recurring measure.”167 Moreover, within each 
 
subsidies). 
 161. Id. art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25; see USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 
(explaining that the standard of “serious adverse effects” that non-actionable 
subsidies must meet is a much higher standard than the “serious prejudice” or 
“injury” standard for other subsidies). 
 162. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.2(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 24 
(including assistance to promote the adaptation of existing facilities to 
environmental regulations in the category of non-actionable subsidies). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 1 (mandating that 
installations reduce greenhouse gas emissions and establishing a scheme to 
facilitate carbon dioxide emissions trading between the Member States). 
 165. GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 4. 
 166. Id. at 21. 
 167. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.2(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 24 
(explaining that although the environmental regulations would result in “greater 
constraints and financial burden” on the installations, the assistance is only non-
actionable if it is a “one-time non-recurring measure” and meets the four other 
criteria listed in 8.2(c)). 
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Phase, Germany issues the allowances in annual distributions.168 
Thus, the measure is recurring. 
Nevertheless, even if Germany convinced a panel that it met all 
the criteria for a non-actionable environmental subsidy, the panel 
may still recommend that it remove the measure.169 A Member State 
could challenge the measure because it caused “serious adverse 
effects”170 to its steel industry that were too “difficult to repair.”171 If 
a Subsidies Committee agreed, then Germany would have to remove 
the measure within six months.172 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The European Union cannot accomplish the lofty objective of the 
E.U. Scheme if its Member States distribute emissions allowances 
free of charge. The E.U. Scheme can operate at its most efficient 
level and achieve emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost 
and in the most effective manner possible173 only if Member States 
distribute allowances under the auction method.174 The Council 
should amend the Directive in the following two key ways to prepare 
for Phase II of the E.U. Scheme. 
 
 168. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 4 (detailing that Germany will issue 
the emissions allowances yearly by February 28 “of the year in question”). 
 169. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 9.4, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25 (noting 
that if a Committee concludes that serious adverse effects exist, it may recommend 
that the subsidizing Member Country modify its measure to remove the effects). If 
the Member Country does not modify its measure, the Committee can authorize 
the “requesting Member to take appropriate countermeasures.” Id. 
 170. Id. art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 (explaining that two Member 
Countries can determine through consultations whether a subsidy caused serious 
adverse effects, and if these consultations are unsuccessful, then a Subsidies 
Committee has 120 days to determine whether the measure meets the higher 
serious adverse effects standard). In addition, if a Committee does find serious 
adverse effects, the subsidizing Member Country has six months to remove them, 
or the Committee can authorize the complaining Member Country to take 
proportional countermeasures. Id. 
 173. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 700 (affirming that the current design of 
the method of allocation in the E.U. Scheme results in efficiency concerns relating 
to the proper functioning of the market to achieve the environmental goals that the 
Directive envisioned and equity concerns relating to the redistribution of wealth). 
 174. CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 27. 
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First, the Council should ensure that Member States impose a 
minimum level of scarcity on the amount of emissions allowances 
they establish in their Macroplans by providing a uniform formula to 
calculate this level. Second, the Council should give Member States 
strict guidelines regarding the methods of distribution that they 
include in their Microplans. Further, the Council should not hesitate 
to reject NAPs that do not conform to the criteria that it 
establishes.175 
A.  THE COUNCIL SHOULD AMEND THE DIRECTIVE TO ENSURE 
THAT MEMBER STATES IMPOSE A UNIFORM MINIMUM LEVEL OF 
SCARCITY 
The E.U. Scheme allows installations to make higher profits from 
low carbon technologies and provides incentives for installations to 
invest in those technologies.176 Those in favor of allocations of free 
allowances argue that a free “needs-based” allocation process is 
necessary to secure the German industries’ competitive position.177  
However, installations within an industry gain a competitive edge 
when they engage in activities that allow them to use less of their 
emissions allowances, so the allocation of free allowances has no 
impact on competitiveness.178 Therefore, Member States should 
integrate emissions allowances into industries as a new scarce 
resource, so that the scarcity factor will control the market value of 
emissions allowances.179 Otherwise, without a sufficient degree of 
 
 175. See id. art. 9 (allowing the Council to reject a Member State’s NAP within 
three months of its submission if it does not meet the criteria set forth in Article 10 
and Annex III of the Directive); see also Watchman, supra note 57, at 201 
(elaborating that the Council reduced the amount of emissions that Member States 
planned to allocate in their initial NAP submissions by four percent). Furthermore, 
the Council rejected thirteen NAPs for allowing adjustments to the amount of 
allowances that they allocated to installations. Id. 
 176. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
2 (demonstrating that the E.U. Scheme’s regulatory provisions do not inhibit an 
industry’s competitive edge). 
 177. See id. (arguing the paradoxical nature of the argument because capping 
emissions is inherent in the success of an emissions trading system, and by basing 
allocation on needs, the Member States would no longer be able to attain the 
objective of capping emissions). 
 178. See id. (observing that “changes in competitiveness” arise from the scarcity 
of emissions allowances). 
 179. See id. at 3 (explaining that because carbon dioxide emissions effectively 
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scarcity, installations would have no need to buy or sell emissions 
allowances.180 
As it currently stands, the Directive does not give the Council any 
legal basis for imposing a specific minimum level of scarcity on the 
allocation of emissions allowances.181 The Council should devise a 
central formula that Member States must use to calculate the total 
amount of emissions allowances they will allocate during Phase II.  
By doing so the Council will ensure that the price of the emissions 
reflects market values. 
Since Annex III of the Directive gives Member States criteria to 
follow when they devise their NAPs,182 within this Annex, the 
Council should calculate the most efficient formula to achieve the 
optimal minimum level of scarcity for the quantity of emissions 
allowances that Member States should include in their Macroplans 
for Phase II.183 The Council should mandate that Member States use 
this formula when they calculate their emissions budgets. If need be, 
it should update the formula during subsequent phases to adapt to 
future conditions. 
B.  THE COUNCIL SHOULD AMEND THE DIRECTIVE TO ENSURE 
THAT THE MEMBER STATES USE CONSISTENT METHODS OF 
DISTRIBUTION 
The Council devised the E.U. Scheme in a way that gave Member 
States too much discretion when they develop their NAPs. This 
discretion allows Member States to use distribution methods that do 
not result in the most efficient allocation of emissions allowances. 
The Council should mandate that every Member State use the same 
methods of allocating allowances for every installation. By doing so, 
it will ensure that social factors, political factors, or powerful interest 
 
become traded goods, installations must take their costs into account when 
planning optimal production quantities, and therefore, they represent a new 
constraint to those operating installations). 
 180. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 708 (stressing that with insufficient 
scarcity, Phase I of the E.U. Scheme “would serve no practical purpose”). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, Annex III. 
 183. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 6 (explaining that Macroplans define 
the total emissions budget of Member States and include the total quantity of 
emissions allowances that a Member State can allocate). 
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groups do not bias the Member States’ governments when they 
devise their Microplans.184 This will result in a fairer allocation of 
emissions allowances to industries between the Member States. 
First, the Council should eliminate the use of special rules that 
Member States can apply under certain circumstances.185 Next, the 
Council should amend Article 10 of the Directive, which mandates 
that Member States distribute at least ninety percent of emissions 
allowances free of charge during Phase II.186 As Part III above 
demonstrates, when Member States allocate emissions allowances 
free of charge, they become vulnerable to subsidy claims under the 
SCM Agreement.187 The Council should allow for a gradual 
transition into a system that mandates that installations bid for one-
hundred percent of their emissions allowances.188 Thus, during Phase 
II, the Council should mandate that each Member State shall allocate 
seventy-five percent of emissions allowances free of charge.189 
Member States should allocate the same number of allowances 
free of charge to avoid unfairness between the countries and possible 
subsidy claims.190 In addition, Article 10 should include a separate 
paragraph stating which distribution methods each Member State 
should employ: 
 
 184. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702 (noting that the influence of powerful 
interest groups can make state regulators vulnerable and can bias them to favor 
certain installations when they make their allocation decisions). 
 185. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 
12 (opining that the special rules foster uncertainty and strategic behavior and as a 
result, installations postpone investment in low carbon technology). 
 186. Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10. 
 187. See supra Part III.A–B (analyzing that a panel could conclude that the 
allocation of free emissions allowances by Germany is a subsidy, and it could be 
either actionable or non-actionable). If the subsidy is non-actionable, Germany 
may still have to modify the measures to remove serious adverse effects to other 
Member States. See id. Part III.B.2. 
 188. See CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 27 (explaining that the only way that 
governments can implement the “polluter pays principle” in the E.U. Scheme is by 
using the auction method of distribution and mandating that installations pay for all 
of their emissions allowances). 
 189. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10 (allowing a less 
stringent method of allocation by stating “Member States shall allocate at least 
ninety percent of the allowances free of charge”) (emphasis added). 
 190. See supra Part III.A (analyzing how subsidies can arise when some 
countries allow the allocation of free emissions allowances, and others do not). 
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Each Member State must allocate allowances for the five-year 
period beginning 1 January 2008 using the same distribution 
methods. For each industry, twenty-five percent of the allowances 
must be auctioned to the highest bidder, twenty-five percent of the 
allowances must be granted free of charge using the grandfathering 
method of distribution, and fifty percent of the allowances must be 
granted free of charge using the benchmarking method of 
distribution. 
Consistency in allocation methods between Member States will 
ensure fairness. Therefore, the Council should not allow Member 
States to auction more or less than twenty-five percent of allowances 
for Phase II.191 However, during subsequent phases of the E.U. 
Scheme, the Council should mandate that Member States distribute 
one-hundred percent of the emissions allowances through the auction 
method.192 By ensuring that the allocation methodologies between 
the Member States are consistent and harmonized,193 the Council will 
guarantee that a fair allocation of emissions allowances results and 
will avoid possible subsidy claims between Member States. 
Throughout the review and approval process, the Council should 
take advantage of its oversight power over the NAPs, and should 
reject those that do not conform. 194  Although the Council has the 
 
 191. See supra Part III.A–B (demonstrating that even though the auction method 
is the most efficient, when Member States use inconsistent methods of allocation, 
this could result in possible subsidy claims). 
 192. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 30(c) (acknowledging 
the need to harmonize the methods of distribution between the Member States 
during subsequent phases of the E.U. Scheme); see also CAN EUROPE, supra note 
67, at 27 (reaffirming the Council’s consideration, which it articulated in Article 
30, and recommending that Member States increase the use of the auction method 
during future phases). In addition, the auction method is preferable to the 
grandfathering and benchmark methods because it generates revenue that the 
government can use to spend on research and development for more fuel-efficient 
technologies. Id. 
 193. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 728 (arguing that a fair allocation of 
emissions allowances that has minimal negative distributional consequences results 
from a “consistent methodology or allocation formula” across the Member States 
of the European Union). 
 194. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 9. But see Kurkowski, 
supra note 13, at 709–10 (arguing that the E.U. Scheme should allow Member 
States to have some flexibility when they devise their NAPs). One should weigh 
any distributional consequences against state sovereignty concerns, and the fact 
that each Member State is probably in the best position to determine how many 
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authorization to amend the Directive,195 if it chooses not to amend it, 
however, the Member States should, and can, do so by a majority 
vote.196 By amending the Directive, the Member States will ensure 
that the European Union meets the goals and objectives of the 
Directive,197 not only at the lowest possible cost, but also through the 
most effective means possible. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Even though the E.U. Scheme is a good model for emissions 
trading in the international arena and meeting commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol, as the German NAP demonstrates, the E.U. 
Scheme is still not perfect. The Council can, and should, amend the 
E.U. Scheme to eliminate possible subsidy claims between Member 
States. By imposing a uniform formula for Member States to 
calculate allowance caps to ensure scarcity, and by harmonizing 
allocation methods between the Member States, the European Union 
will be able to attain emissions reductions in the most cost-effective 
and equitable manner possible. 
 
 
emissions allowances each industry and its various installations should receive. Id. 
 195. See supra Part IV.A–B (recommending the ways in which the Council 
should amend the Directive). 
 196. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 729 (explaining that while the Council 
can amend the Directive, it “has indicated that it does not intend to do so”). 
 197. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, ¶ 5 (stating that the goal of 
the Directive is to help Member States achieve their reduction commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol “through an efficient European market in greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, with the least possible diminution of economic development 
and employment”). 
